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Tax  reduction  has  been  a  major  policy  issue  in  the  United  States 
since  the  early  1980s.  Proponents  of  reduction  usually  assert  that  the 
purpose  of  their  proposals  is  to  lift  the  restraining  burden  of  taxation 
from  the  shoulders  of  business  and  investors  (or,  in  other  words,  to 
reduce  government  interference  in  the  marketplace)  and  thereby 
stimulate  work,  saving,  and  investment.  Much  of  the  debate  about 
tax  cuts  in  the  popular  press  and  policy  arena  rests  on  the  “convcn- 
tional  wisdom”  that  the  nation  must  increase  its  rate  of  saving. 
One  of  the  most  controversial  tax  proposals  is  a  reduction  in  levies 
against  capital  gains  income.  Such  a  cut  was  recommended  by  the 
Bush  administration  in  the  late  198Os,  was  a  major  part  of  the  tax 
plan  that  emerged  from  the  Republican  “Contract  with  America”  in 
the  U.S.  House  of  Representatives  in  1995,  and  has  recently  been 
advocated  in  various  forms  by  both  Democratic  and  Republican  lead- 
ers.  Proposals  put  forth  by  the  National  Commission  on  Economic 
Growth  and  Tax  Reform,  by  the  Joint  Economic  Committee,  and  in 
the  Nunn-Domenici  tax  proposal  endorse  exempting  capital  gains 
income  or  investment  income  from  taxation.  These  proposals  are 
predicated  on  the  assumption  that  a  reduction  in  the  effective  rate  of 
taxation  on  capital  gains  income,  coupled  with  a  sharp  decline  in 
interest  rates,  will  fuel  a  surge  of  private  investment  and  economic 
growth. 
There  have  been  many  studies  about  how  capital  gains  taxes  affect 
economic  variables  and  decision  making  in  the  private  sector.  Some 
studies  focus  on  how  a  reduction  in  the  capital  gains  tax-through  a 
cut  in  rates,  an  indexation  of  capital  gains  income  for  inflation,  or 
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both-might  affect  the  distribution  of  income  and  wealth.  Other 
studies  ask  how  a  reduction  in  the  tax  might  affect  government  tax 
revenues.  Still  others  focus  on  how  a  change  in  the  structure  of  the  tax 
might  influence  the  behavior  of  corporate  and  individual  investors. 
In  this  P&c  Policy  Brief  Steven  M.  Fazzari  and  Benjamin  Hereon 
scrutinize  the  fundamental  assumptions  of  the  saving  scenario-that 
a  capital  gains  tax  cut  will  necessarily  produce  an  increase  in  national 
saving  and  investment  -and  find  it  lacking.  They  assert  that  business 
entrepreneurs  will  not  necessarily  view  the  capital  gains  tax  in  the 
same  manner  as  individual  investors  or  use  the  tax  as  the  criterion  on 
which  to  base  their  investment  decisions.  They  then  analyze  how  a 
cut  in  the  capital  gains  tax  would  affect  decision  making  in  the  cor- 
porate  sector,  that  is,  how  such  a  reduction  would  alter  a  firm’s  deci- 
sion  to  undertake  investment. 
Fazzari  and  Herzon  find  that  neither  cutting  the  capital  gains  tax  rate 
nor  indexing  capital  gains  income  to  inflation  will  have  more  than  a 
minimal  influence  on  economic  growth.  This  finding  challenges  the 
idea  that  such  policies  represent  strategies  for  growth.  We  hope  that 
this  study  expands  the  scope  of  analysis  of  economic  decision-making 
processes,  widens  the  inquiry  about  the  effects  of  changes  in  the  tax 
structure,  and  serves  as  a  prudent  contribution  to  the  debate  about 
how  best  to  stimulate  capital  formation  and  economic  growth. 
Dimitri  B.  l’apadimitriou 
Executive  Director 
April  1996 
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Tax  cuts  have  been  a  prominent  issue  in  the  U.S.  conservative  political 
uprisings  of  the  early  1980s  and  mid  1990s.  The  stated  economic  objec- 
tive  of  proposed  cuts  is  to  “get  government  off  the  backs”  of  the  private 
economy  to  stimulate  work,  saving,  and  investment.  A  cut  in  taxes  on 
capital  gains  income  is  among  the  most  controversial  of  these  proposals. 
The  Bush  administration  recommended  such  a  cut,  and  it  now  is  a  major 
part  of  the  tax  plan  that  has  emerged  from  the  Republican  “Contract 
with  America”  in  the  U.S.  House  of  Representatives.  Because  much  of 
the  reward  to  entrepreneurial  activity  accrues  in  the  form  of  capital 
gains,  proponents  of  tax  cuts  argue  that  lower  capital  gains  rates  will  be 
an  especially  potent  stimulus  ro  productive  economic  activity.  Critics, 
however?  assert  that  most  capital  gains  income  goes  to  relatively  wealthy 
taxpayers;  therefore,  cutting  capital  gains  taxes  would  disproportionately 
benefit  the  wealthy  at  a  time  when  deficit  reduction  plans  are  squeezing 
many  federal  programs  that  benefit  the  poor  and  middle  classes. 
In  this  f3rie_f  we  assess  the  economic  benefits  of  a  capital  gains  tax  cut. 
We  consider  a  variety  of  channels  through  which  capital  gains  taxes 
might  affect  economic  decisions  and  find  that  there  is  little  theoretical 
or  empirical  basis  for  the  view  that  lower  capital  gains  tax  rates  would 
have  a  substantial  effect  on  economic  growth  or  level  of  economic  activity. 
The  reasons  for  this  conclusion  can  be  divided  into  two  broad  classes. 
First,  some  faulty  theoretical  assumptions  in  much  of  the  popular  discus- 
sion  about  the  capital  gains  tax  result  in  misleading  conclusions  about  its 
economic  impact.  For  example,  most  journalistic  accounts  of  the  debate 
about  this  topic  assume  that  when  the  tax  on  rewards  from  entrepreneur- 
ial  activity  falls,  more  investment  projects  will  be  undertaken.  We  show, 
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however,  that,  as  a  first  approximation,  changes  in  taxes  on  profits,  such 
as  the  capital  gains  tax,  do  not  affect  decisions  by  firms  to  undertake 
investment  projects.  Second,  although,  in  theory,  capital  gains  tax  rates 
do  affect  investment  activity-in  particular,  when  the  capital  gains  tax 
rate  is  different  from  the  tax  rate  on  the  returns  from  other  kinds  of 
investment-we  find  that  the  empirical  significance  of  these  effects  is 
small  and  possibly  negligible.  We  estimate  that  the  current  proposal  to 
lower  the  highest  capital  gains  tax  rate  from  28.0  to  19.8  percent  would 
reduce  the  effective  cost  of  capital  between  1.0  and  2.0  percent;  using 
assumptions  rhat  represent  u~eruge  values  in  the  U.S.  economy,  we  esti- 
mate  a  decline  of  only  1.1  percent.  Proposals  to  index  capital  gains 
income  for  inflation  would  have  a  somewhat  larger,  but  still  small,  effect. 
Using  the  average  assumptions,  the  indexation  provision  would  reduce 
the  effective  cost  of  capital  by  1.6  percent. 
The  economic  effect  of  such  tax  rate  or  indexation  changes  is  minimal. 
Theoretically,  a  one-time  change  in  the  cost  of  capital  does  not  affect  the 
long-run  growth  rate  of  the  economy;  it  affects  only  the  level  of  output. 
Using  assumptions  that  are  generous  to  the  capital  gains  tax  cut  and  index- 
ation  provisions,  we  find  that  their  long-term  effect  on  output  amounts 
to  about  one-third  of  one  percent  of  U.S.  gross  domestic  product  (GDP). 
In  other  words,  the  long-term  economic  impact  of  such  a  policy  would 
be  no  greater  than  the  impact  of  roughly  two  months  of  normal  eco- 
nomic  growth,  and  it  would  take  years  to  realize  even  this  small  benefit. 
These  results  lead  us  to  the  conclusion  that  proponents  of  a  tax  cut  over- 
state  the  stimulus  to  investment  that  could  be  expected  from  the  cut.  It 
is  likely  that  most  &ture  investment  activity  that  would  benefit  from  a 
lower  capital  gains  tax  rate  would  be  undertaken  at  the  current  capital 
gains  rate,  which  is  already  effectively  much  lower  than  the  highest  mar- 
ginal  tax  rate  on  ordinary  income.  We  dispute  the  claim  that  a  lower 
capital  gains  tax  rate  would  have  large  beneficial  effects  on  output, 
growth,  or  entrepreneurial  activity  in  the  U.S.  economy.  The  debate 
over  the  appropriate  capital  gains  tax  rate  should  focus  on  other  consid- 
erations.  These  include  the  distribution  of  tax  burdens  across  individuals 
and  time  periods. 
It  is  clear  that  most  capital  gains  income  accrues  to  relatively  wealthy 
taxpayers  and  that  cutting  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  would  benefit  these 
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individuals  most.  Feenberg  and  Summers  (1990),  for  example,  show  that 
over  half  of  capital  gains  income  goes  to  individuals  in  the  top  1  percent 
of  the  income  distribution.1  E+ity  considerations  might  therefore  suggest 
that  lower  capital  gains  rates  are  undesirable.  Indeed,  since  aspects  of  the 
current  tax  law  already  create  preferences  for  cdpitdl  gains  income,  one 
might  argue  that  capital  gains  rates  should  be  increased  to  achieve  a  more 
progressive  tax  system.  The  fact  that  nominal  (rather  than  “real”)  capital 
gains  are  taxed,  however,  implies  that  effective  capital  gains  tax  rates  vary 
arbitrarily  across  time  with  inflation  rates.  Some  proposals  attempt  to 
eliminate  this  problem  by  indexing  capital  gains  taxes  to  inflation. 
Another  point  of  contention  in  the  debate  over  a  capital  gains  tax  cut  is 
whether  it  will  increase  or  decrease  tax  revenue.  Some  analysts  argue 
that  “realizations”  of  capital  gains  may  increase  so  much  foIlowing  a  tax 
cut  that  the  government  may  collect  more  revenue  at  lower  capital  gains 
tax  rates.  Such  conclusions  are  controversial,  however,  and  other  studies 
find  that  a  lower  capital  gains  tax  rate  will  reduce  revenues  and  increase 
the  deficit  (Auten  and  Cordes  1991,  Minarik  1992).  The  effect  of  capi- 
tal  gains  tax  rate  changes  on  the  government’s  fiscal  position  will  likely 
dominate  the  small,  even  negligible  effect  we  find  of  lower  capital  gains 
taxes  on  investment  and  growth. 
We  do  not  dispute  the  fact  that  individual  investors  will  benefit  from  a 
decline  in  the  capital  gains  tax  rate.  In  this  Brief,  however,  we  focus  on 
the  extent  to  which  such  a  cut  will  motivate  firms  to  undertake  invest- 
ment  projects  and  the  possible  effect  of  such  projects  on  economic 
growth  and  investment. 
What  Is  the  Effective  Capital  Gains  Tax  Rate? 
There  have  been  many  modifications  in  the  tax  treatment  of  capital 
gains  since  the  inception  of  the  federal  income  tax  in  1913.2  From  1913 
to  1921  capital  gains  income  was  treated  the  same  as  income  from  any 
other  source.  In  1922  capital  gains  were  distinguished  from  ordinary 
income  for  the  first  time.  Since  then  policymdkers  have  tinkered  with 
capital  gains  taxes  by  altering  the  deductibility  of  capital  losses,  the 
length  of  time  an  asset  must  be  held  for  income  from  it  to  be  considered 
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a  long-term  capital  gain,  the  fraction  of  long-term  capital  gains  income 
that  may  be  excluded  from  taxable  income,  and  the  statutory  tax  rate 
on  capital  gains  income. 
One  way  to  track  the  tax  treatment  of  capital  gains  income  from  year 
to  year  is  to  consider  the  maximum  marginal  tax  rate  on  long-term 
capital  gains  income  under  successive  tax  regimes.  Although  this  rate 
varies  with  the  situation  of  the  taxpayer,  the  general  trend  from  1922 
through  1978  has  been  for  the  maximum  marginal  rate  to  rise.  Under 
fairly  typical  conditions,  the  maximum  marginal  rate  rose  from  12.5 
percent  in  1922  to  49.1  percent  in  1978.  With  passage  of  the  Revenue 
Act  of  1978,  the  maximum  marginal  t.ax  rate  on  capital  gains  income 
dropped  to  28.0  percent.  This  figure  was  derived  by  combining  the 
maximum  personal  tax  rate  on  ordinary  income  (70.0  percent)  with 
the  exclusion  rate  for  capital  gains  income  (60.0  percent).  Thus,  for 
someone  in  the  top  tax  bracket,  a  $1  increase  in  capital  gains  income 
would  create  a  40$  increase  in  taxable  income;  taxing  the  increase  at  a 
rate  of  70.0  percent  yields  28$  in  additional  tax.3  The  Economic 
Recovery  Tax  Act  of  1981  lowered  the  highest  personal  tax  rate  to 
50.0  percent  and  thus  lowered  the  maximum  marginal  tax  rate  on  capi- 
tal  gains  income  to  20.0  percent.  With  passage  of  the  Tax  Reform  Act 
of  1986,  the  highest  rate  on  personal  income  was  lowered  to  28.0  per- 
cent,  but  the  capital  gains  excIusion  was  eliminated,  thereby  raising 
the  maximum  marginal  tax  rate  on  capital  gains  to  28.0  percent.  One 
of  the  provisions  of  the  1986  act  was  that  even  if  marginal  personal  tax 
rates  were  to  increase  in  the  future,  the  maximum  marginal  tax  rate  on 
capital  gains  would  remain  at  28.0  percent;  a  separate  act  would  be 
required  to  increase  this  rate.  Since  the  passage  of  the  1986  act,  the 
highest  marginal  personal  tax  rate  has,  in  fact,  increased  (from  28.0 
percent  to  39.6  percent),  but  the  maximum  marginal  tax  rate  on  capi- 
tal  gains  has  not  been  raised. 
Although  the  current  maximum  marginal  tax  rate  on  capital  gains  is 
28.0  percent,  in  many  cases  the  statutory  rate  does  not  accurately  repree 
sent  the  year-to-year  tax  burden  associated  with  capital  gains  income; 
the  actual  burden  is  usually  lower.  Unlike  personal  income  derived  from 
wages,  dividends,  and  interest,  capital  gains  may  accrue  over  time,  but 
tax  assessments  are  deferred  until  the  gain  is  realized.  To  illustrate  the 
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advantage  derived  from  tax  deferral,  suppose  an  asset  grows  in  value  at  a 
rate  of  20.0  percent  per  year  for  12  years.  The  owner  of  the  asset  will 
have  the  same  after-tax  wealth  whether  the  capital  gain  is  taxed  once  at 
the  end  of  the  12-year  period  at  a  rate  of  28.0  percent  or  once  each  year 
at  an  annual  rate  of  14.0  percent  (for  a  more  detailed  treatment,  see 
Auerbach  1983,  919n).  Th  us,  when  we  compare  the  tax  rate  on  capital 
gains  with  the  tax  rates  on  other  types  of  income  that  are  assessed  every 
year,  we  also  need  to  consider  the  advantage  of  tax  deferral  associated 
with  capital  gains  income. 
It  is  also  the  case  that  many  realizations  of  capital  gains  are  not  subject 
to  any  taxation.  For  example,  an  asset  received  as  inheritance  is  not  sub- 
ject  to  capital  gains  tax  assessment  on  its  past  appreciation.  If  the  new 
owner  (the  heir)  sells  the  asset  immediately,  this  income  is  not  subject  to 
capital  gains  tax  assessment.  Further,  even  if  the  new  owner  holds  the 
asset,  its  base  value  for  purposes  of  computing  future  taxes  is  adjusted  to 
its  value  at  the  time  of  inheritance,  and  the  new  owner  pays  capital  gains 
taxes  at  the  time  the  asset  is  sold  only  on  new  appreciation. 
For  all  of  these  reasons  the  “effective,”  year-to-year  tax  mte  on  capital 
gains  (sometimes  called  the  accrual-equivalent  tax  rate)  is  actually  lower 
than  the  statutory  rate.  The  size  of  the  difference  varies  with  the  taxpayer. 
For  any  given  class  of  taxpayer  the  effective  capital  gains  tax  rate 
declines  with  the  holding  period  of  the  capital  asset,  the  growth  rate  in 
the  value  of  the  asset,  and  the  proportion  of  assets  acquired  through 
inheritance.  To  account  for  the  deferral  advantage  of  capital  gains 
income,  many  studies  halve  the  statutory  rate.  To  account  for  the  inheri- 
tance  advantage  of  capital  gains  income,  they  often  halve  the  rate  again 
(King  and  Fullerton  1984;  Feldstein  and  Summers  1979;  Fullerton  et  al. 
1981;  and  Feldstein,  Poterba,  and  Dicks-Mircaux  1983).  In  the  current 
tax  environment  this  approach  leads  to  an  effective  capital  gains  tax  rate 
of  only  7.0  percent!  Also,  the  size  of  the  adjustments  made  for  deferral 
and  inheritance  effects  is  important  for  evaluating  the  impact  of  changes 
in  the  capital  gains  tax  on  investment  and  growth.  For  example,  the 
impact  of  a  50  percent  cut  in  the  capital  gains  rate  will  be  much  greater 
if  the  initial  rate  is  28.0  percent  than  if  it  is  assumed  to  be  7.0  percent. 
We  have  considered  several  possibilities  for  the  effective  initial  rate  to 
assess  how  they  affect  policy  conclusions. 
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There  appears  to  be  wide  agreement  in  the  popular  press  that  capital 
gains  taxes  discourage  entrepreneurial  activity  and  that  a  capital  gains 
tax  cut  would,  therefore,  be  a  stimulus  to  investment  and  technology. 
For  example,  Steve  Forbes  (1993)  attributes  the  high-technology  “boom 
of  the  1980s”  to  capital  gains  tax  cuts  in  the  late  1970s.  In  a  USA  Tockzy 
article,  Tony  Snow  (1994)  reports  that  “the  1986  increase  in  the  [capital 
gains]  tax  proved  a  disaster  for  capital-hungry  businesses.”  Senator 
Connie  Mack  (199s)  writes  “in  effect  we  threw  away  the  key  to  invest- 
ment  and  economic  growth  in  1987  when  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  was 
increased.”  Views  such  as  these  seem  to  be  based  on  the  rather  intuitive 
notion  that  lowering  the  tax  bite  on  gains  accruing  to  firms  that  make 
profitable  investments  will  enhance  the  incentive  to  undertake  invest- 
ment.  From  this  notion  flow  the  claims  of  higher  growth,  faster  techno- 
logical  progress,  and  an  overall  more  robust  economy  following  a  capital 
gains  tax  cut. 
But  things  are  not  always  what  they  seem  on  the  surface,  and  this  intu- 
itive  view  deserves  scrutiny.  A  deeper  analysis  reveals  a  somewhat  sure 
prising  result:  As  a  first  approximation,  a  cut  in  capital  gains  tax  rates, 
or  in  any  tax  on  the  profits  from  investment  activities,  may  have  no 
effect  on  investment  incentives  for  firms.  We  call  this  result  “tax  rate 
independence.”  We  lay  out  the  logic  and  assumptions  behind  this 
result,  which  will  serve  as  a  kind  of  benchmark  for  analysis.  Then  we 
will  consider  how  the  way  that  the  U.S.  tax  system  operates  might  mod- 
if+  the  result. 
Tax  Rate  Independence 
To  understand  why  capital  gains  tax  rates  might  not  affect  a  firm’s 
investment  decisions,  consider  a  hypothetical  firm  with  managers  who 
maximize  the  value  of  the  firm  for  its  owners.  Suppose  that  the  firm’s 
managers  are  contemplating  an  investment  project  that  they  know  will 
increase  firm  value  by  $l,OOO,OOO.  If  the  capital  gains  from  this  activity 
were  to  accrue  to  the  firm’s  shareholders  free  of  tax,  their  wealth  would 
rise  by  $l,OOO,OOO.  If  the  capital  gains  are  taxed  at  28.0  percent,  share- 
holder  wealth  would  rise  by  only  $720,000. 
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Clearly,  the  shareholders  would  prefer  to  be  free  of  the  capital  gains  tax. 
But  how  would  the  presence  or  absence  of  the  tax  affect  the  decision  of 
the  firm’s  managers  to  undertake  the  investment  project?  The  answer  in 
this  simple  case  is:  not  at  all.  The  project  increases  shareholder  wealth 
even  if  the  gains  are  taxed,  and  the  firm  would  sacrifice  value  for  its 
shareholders  if  it  did  not  invest  in  the  project.  That  is,  while  $l,OOO,OOO 
is  better  than  $720,000,  $720,000  is  better  than  nothing!  This  is  a  case 
of  tax  rate  independence. 
Tax  rate  independence,  however,  relies  on  a  strong  and,  in  practice, 
unrealistic  assumption.  Our  example  assumes  that  the  market  value  of 
the  project  is  unaffected  by  the  imposition  of  capital  gains  taxes.  There 
arc  many  situations  in  which  this  assumption  may  fail  and  the  capital 
gains  tax  rate  could  matter  for  actual  investment  decisions.  For  example, 
capital  gains  taxes  are  levied  on  nominal  rather  than  real  gains.  In  addi- 
tion,  returns  from  some  investments,  such  as  gains  on  the  sale  of  corpo- 
rate  equity,  are  taxed  at  capital  gains  rates,  while  returns  from  other 
assets,  such  as  interest  and  dividend  income,  are  taxed  at  different  rates. 
If  capital  gains  tax  rates  are  cut  while  tax  rates  on  other  assets  are 
unchanged,  some  projects  that  generate  capital  gains  may  be  favored 
over  investments  in  interest-bearing  assets  that  would  have  been  under- 
taken  had  the  capital  gains  rate  remained  unchanged.  In  the  following 
discussion,  we  shall  consider  these  and  other  conditions  that  may  cause 
tax  rate  independence  to  fail.  Still,  tax  rate  independence  is  a  useful 
benchmark,  and  it  is  an  effective  counterargument  to  the  simple  view 
that  cutting  capital  gains  tax  rates  will  automatically  stimulate  invest- 
ment  because  of  the  reduced  tax  bite  on  the  gains  from  successful  invest- 
ment  projects  accruing  to  shareholders.  Although  asset  owners  obviously 
prefer  lower  tax  rates  on  their  capital  gains,  it  is  not  so  obvious  that 
lower  tax  rates  change  a  firm’s  decisions  about  whether  to  undertake 
investment  projects.  To  determine  the  effect  of  capital  gains  taxes  on 
investment  decisions,  we  must  move  beyond  simple  intuition. 
Uncertainty  and  Risk  Aversion 
The  simple  case  of  tax  rate  independence  ignores  two  aspects  of  invest- 
ment  decisions  that  many  analysts  consider  crucial  to  the  debate  over 
cutting  capital  gains  taxes:  uncertainty  and  risk  aversion.  Uncertainty 
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alone  will  not  change  tax  rate  independence,  but  uncertainty  combined 
with  a  desire  of  entrepreneurs  to  avoid  risk  may  make  a  difference. 
Suppose  a  firm  has  a  potential  investment  project  with  an  uncertain, 
rather  than  a  sure,  return.  The  firm’s  managers  believe  the  project  has  a 
50  percent  chance  of  increasing  the  firm’s  value  by  $2,OCQOOO,  but  there 
is  also  a  SO  percent  chance  that  the  project  will  fail  and  the  firm’s  value 
will  fal1  by  the  amount  of  the  project’s  start-up  cost,  which  we  assume  to 
be  $100,000.  If  the  firm’s  owners  do  not  care  about  the  project’s  risk 
(that  is,  if  they  are  risk  neutral),  standard  economic  theory  predicts  that 
the  firm  will  undertake  the  project  if  the  weighted  average  of  possible 
project  returns  is  positive.  The  weights  in  this  average  are  the  probabih- 
ties  associated  with  each  return.4  In  our  example,  this  calculation,  called 
the  “expected  value”  of  the  project,  would  be 
(0.50  x  $2400,000)  +  (0.50  x  -$100,000)  =  $950,000 
By  these  calculations,  a  firm  with  risk-neutral  owners  would  undertake 
the  project  because  it  would  raise  the  firm’s  expected  value.  If  the  gov- 
ernment  imposes  a  tax  on  the  owner’s  capital  gain  if  the  project  is  suc- 
cessful,  but  allows  them  to  write  off  their  capital  loss  against  other 
income  if  the  project  fails,  the  project’s  expected  value  will  fall,  but  will 
remain  positive  for  any  capital  gains  tax  rate  less  than  100  percent.  The 
firm  would  still  undertake  the  project  to  increase  the  expected  wealth  of 
its  owners5  In  this  situation,  a  cut  in  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  would  not 
affect  the  firm’s  decision  to  undertake  investment  projects,  and  tax  rate 
independence  holds. 
It  may  seem  restrictive  to  assume  that  the  firm’s  owners  do  not  care 
about  the  risk  of  the  firm’s  projects,  but  there  are  good  reasons  to  believe 
that  a  large  portion  of  U.S.  capital  investment  is  undertaken  in  just  this 
kind  of  situation.  Most  empirical  research  on  individual  attitudes  toward 
risk  finds  that  individuals  are  risk  averse  (for  example,  Zeldes  1989). 
However,  owners  who  can  diversify  their  investments  may  still  want  the 
managers  of  a  firm  to  make  investment  decisions  without  concern  about 
risk.6  An  investor  cares  about  the  risk  of  her  total  portfolio,  and  that  risk 
is  negligibly  affected  by  the  risk  of  any  single  firm  when  her  investments 
are  diversified.  The  best  thing  a  firm’s  managers  can  do  for  a  diversified 
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owner  is  to  maximize  the  firm’s  expected  value.  As  we  have  seen  above, 
this  kind  of  attitude  on  the  part  of  managers  and  owners  leads  to  tax  rate 
independence. 
How  much  investment  in  the  economy  is  carried  out  by  firms  with  diversi- 
fied  ownership?  There  is  no  way  to  obtain  a  precise  figure,  but  it  is  sugges. 
tive  that  the  publicly  traded  companies  tracked  by  the  Compustat  data 
service  accounted  for  roughly  half  of  aggregate  U.S.  plant  and  equipment 
spending  and  that  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  most  owners  of  public 
firms,  especially  large  public  firms,  are  well  diversified.  Moreover,  a  sub- 
stantial  portion  of  private  firms  are  owned  by  institutional  investors  such 
as  pension  funds,  mutual  iGrids,  life  insurance  companies,  or  even  venture 
capital  6u-tds,  in  which  we  may  also  assume  diversification. 
There  are  important  situations,  however,  in  which  owners’  personal  atti- 
tudes  toward  risk  may  play  a  role  in  the  decision  to  undertake  an  invest- 
ment  project  with  uncertain  outcomes.  Substantial  evidence  has  been 
compiled  showing  that  a  firm’s  investment  may  be  restricted  by  the  avail- 
ability  of  credit  or  the  ability  to  sell  new  equity  on  the  open  market.7  In 
such  an  environment  a  firm  will  rely  more  heavily  on  internal  funds  to 
finance  investment,  that  is,  on  funds  generated  from  firm  profits  or  money 
put  up  from  the  personal  wealth  of  firm  “insiders”  who  have  detailed 
knowledge  about  the  firm’s  operations  and  opportunities.  The  insider 
group  may  be  small,  possibly  consisting  of  a  single  entrepreneur  or  a  small 
venture  capital  group.  If  the  funds  invested  in  the  firm  constitute  a  sub- 
stantial  portion  of  the  insiders’  wealth,  their  portfolios  will  not  be  diversi- 
fied.8  Investors  with  undiversified  portfolios  will  tend  to  be  risk  avense. 
Investment  undertaken  under  these  circumstances  is  likely  to  be  impor- 
tant  for  economic  growth.  Venture  capital,  for  example,  is  concentrated 
in  high-technology  activities  (Al-Suwailem  1995).9  Much  of  the 
rhetoric  in  support  of  cutting  capital  gains  tax  rates  argues  that  this  is 
the  kind  of  activity  that  lower  capital  gains  taxes  will  encourage.  We  will 
now  evaluate  this  claim. 
Tax  rate  independence  will  generally  not  hold  for  investment  projects 
undertaken  by  firms  with  undiversified  (and  therefore  risk-averse) 
ownership.  Capital  gains  tax  cuts  might  cause  a  firm  in  this  situation  to 
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invest  in  a  project  it  would  have  rejected  when  its  owners  faced  a  higher 
tax  rate.  But  what  is  usually  not  recognized  is  that  the  opposite  result  can 
also  occur:  lower  capital  gains  tax  rates  might  discmmge  investment  for  a 
firm  with  undiversified  owners. 
Recall  our  example  abov+the  project  with  a  $950,000  expected  value 
and  50  percent  chance  of  failure.  Because  the  project  has  a  positive 
expected  value,  a  risk-neutral  investor  will  undertake  it  regardless  of 
what  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  is.  The  project  will  have  less  value  to  a 
risk-averse  investor  because  the  uncertainty  associated  with  the  project’s 
returns  will  reduce,  to  some  extent,  the  benefits  of  the  average  gain. 
How  will  a  change  in  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  affect  the  investment 
decision  of  the  risk-averse  individual?  A  lower  capital  gains  tax  rate  will 
increase  the  reward  he  obtains  if  the  project  is  successful.  But  to  the 
extent  that  capital  losses  are  deductible  against  other  capital  gains 
income,  a  lower  capital  gains  rate  also  will  reduce  the  value  of  his  tax 
deduction  should  the  project  faiLjO  It  appears  that  a  lower  capital  gains 
tax  rate  could  make  the  project  either  more  valuable  or  less  valuable  to  a 
risk-averse  investor. 
A  deeper  look  at  the  economic  theory  underlying  this  situation  shows 
that  if  an  investor  is  just  slightly  risk  averse,  a  lower  capital  gains  tax  rate 
will  increase  the  value  she  places  on  an  uncertain  project.  As  risk  aver- 
sion  rises  beyond  some  critical  level,  however,  a  perverse  result  is  more 
likely  to  occur,  that  is,  lower  capital  gains  tax  rates  will  decrease  an 
investor’s  valuation  of  the  project.  This  occurs  because  the  benefit  of 
lower  taxes  obtained  when  the  project  is  successful  is  not  sufficient  to 
offset  the  loss  incurred  from  the  lower  tax  deduction  when  the  project 
fails.11  (A  numerical  example  of  this  point  is  included  in  the  appendix. 
it  shows  that  with  reasonable  assumptions  about  an  entrepreneur’s  risk 
aversion,  a  lower  capital  gains  tax  rate  may  actually  reduce  the  desir- 
ability  of  an  investment  project.) 
Theoretically,  the  perverse  result  is  more  likely  when  investors  are  risk 
averse,  and  greater  risk  aversion  is  most  likely  when  a  project  is  under- 
taken  by  undiversified  investors  who  put  a  substantial  portion  of  their 
personal  wealth  at  risk  to  undertake  the  project.  This  situation  is  most 
likely  to  arise  in  firms  that  do  not  have  good  access  to  public  securities 
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markets  &cause  of  severe  information  problems,  an  environment  often 
associated  with  investments  in  new,  high-technology  industries. 
The  perverse  result  is  also  more  likely  for  a  project  with  a  low  probability 
of  success,  but  with  a  high  payoff  if  it  is  successful.  This  situation  also 
characterizes  much  high-technology  or  venture  capital  investment.  So  it 
appears  that  a  lower  capital  gains  tax  rate  is  more  likely  to  have  a  per. 
verse  effect  on  investment  in  the  very  kinds  of  projects  that  proponents 
of  capital  gains  tax  cuts  often  target  for  assistance. 
The  repercussions  of  tax  policy  on  risk  taking  are  complex  phenomena, 
In  some  cases  lower  capital  gains  tax  rates  might  boost  investment,  but 
the  aggregate  impact  seems  limited  because  much  investment  is  under- 
taken  in  situations  in  which  this  boosting  effect  is  not  relevant. 
Furthermore,  even  when  uncertainty  and  risk  aversion  matter  for  invest- 
ment  decisions,  it  is  not  clear  that  cutting  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  will 
encourage  more  investment.  We  conclude  that  there  is  no  strong  theo- 
retical  or  empirical  evidence  that  supports  the  view  that  a  lower  capital 
gains  tax  rate  encourages  risk  taking  to  a  significant  degree. 
LockeIn  Effect 
Research  on  capital  gains  taxes  has  identified  another  channel  through 
which  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  may  affect  the  level  and  allocation  of 
investment.  The  “lock-in”  effect  is  the  tendency  of  holders  of  old  assets 
with  relatively  low  returns  to  hold  onto  those  assets  rather  than  sell 
them  and  invest  in  new  assets  with  higher  returns.  A  consequence  of 
the  lock-in  effect  is  that  more  productive  ventures  remain  unexploited 
because  the  tax  code  discourages  investors  from  reallocating  their 
funds  into  activities  with  the  highest  returns.  Some  have  argued  that  a 
reduction  in  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  would  mitigate  the  lock-in 
effect,  thereby  increasing  the  productivity  of  investment  and  enhanc- 
ing  the  technical  efficiency  of  the  U.S.  capital  stock.  For  example, 
Senator  Connie  Mack  writes  that  “by  reducing  the  capital  gains  tax 
rate  .  .  .  $1.5  trillion  in  locked-up  gains  can  be  released  to  pursue 
investment  opportunities  that  create  jobs  and  growth  in  the  U.S.  econ- 
omy”  (Mack  1995). 
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To  understand  how  the  capital  gains  tax  may  create  a  lock-in  friction  in 
the  flow  of  financial  capital  to  its  most  productive  uses,  we  need  to 
identify  the  incentives  that  influence  a  pottfolio  holder  who  is  consider- 
ing  reallocating  her  wealth  between  assets.  An  investor  will  reallocate 
capital  between  assets  as  long  as  the  benefits  of  doing  so  exceed  the 
costs.  An  obvious  benefit  of  reallocation  is  the  potentially  higher  rate  of 
return  achieved  by  selling  lower-return  assets  and  using  the  proceeds  to 
purchase  higher-return  assets.  Recall,  however,  that  because  the  capital 
gains  tax  is  levied  upon  the  realization  of  capital  gains  rather  than  on 
their  year-to-year  accrued  value,  there  is  also  a  tax  benefit  (which 
increases  as  an  asset’s  holding  period  increases)  to  holding  any  asset.  It 
may  be  that  the  tax  benefit  of  holding  onto  a  lower-return  asset  exceeds 
the  gain  from  switching  to  an  asset  with  higher  returns.  The  lower  the 
capital  gains  tax  rate,  the  lower  the  benefits  from  accrual  and  the  lower 
the  cost  of  portfolio  reallocation.  (A  numerical  example  of  the  lock-in 
effect  is  given  in  the  appendix.) 
Recall  that  it  is  argued  that  the  malady  of  the  lock-in  effect  is  that  it  cre- 
ates  inefficient  allocation  of  aggregate  capital  resources.  However,  in  the 
aggregate,  the  lock-in  effect  may  not  be  very  important.  Not  all  investors 
are  subject  to  the  capital  gains  tax.  In  particular,  large  institutiona 
investors,  such  as  pension  funds,  are  not  subject  to  the  capital  gains  tax. 
From  1980  to  199.3  the  contribution  from  insurance  and  pension  reserves 
to  total  annual  increases  in  financial  assets  averaged  47.0  percent 
(Council  of  Economic  Advisers  1995,  Table  B-30).  Minarik  writes  that 
“owners  of  about  half  of  all  corporate  equity  are  entities  that  are  unaf- 
fected  by  the  capital  gains  tax  because  they  are  either  non-taxable  U.S. 
institutions  or  foreigners  not  subject  to  U.S.  taxation  on  capital  gains” 
(1992,  20).  Thus,  ahhough  some  investors  may  experience  the  lock-in 
effect,  a  significant  portion  of  financial  investment  is  undertaken  by 
investors  who  do  not.  With  the  existence  of  these  large  uninhibited 
organizations,  it  is  difficult  to  argue  that  there  are  significant  unex- 
plaited  profit  opportunities  in  capital  markets  that  could  be  tapped  with 
a  reduction  in  the  capital  gains  tax  rate.  Put  another  way,  although 
reducing  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  would  mitigate  the  lock-in  effect, 
doing  so  would  not  necessarily  increase  the  productivity  of  the  capital 
stock.12 
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In  addition,  even  if  all  investors  experienced  the  consequences  of  the 
lock-in  effect,  the  solution  would  not  necessarily  be  to  lower  the  capital 
gains  tax  rate.  The  lock-in  effect  exists  because  capital  gains  are  taxed 
on  realization  rather  than  accrual.  A  more  comprehensive  solution 
would  be  to  convert  the  capital  gains  tax  to  an  accrual-based  tax.  This 
possibility  has  been  explored  in  the  economics  literature  (Auerbach 
1992).  There  are,  however,  problems  with  such  a  tax.  For  some  assets, 
in  particular  assets  traded  on  well-organized  markets,  an  accrual-based 
capital  gains  tax  is  feasible  because,  since  the  value  of  these  assets  is  set 
and  accessible  every  day,  it  is  straightforward  to  determine  their  value. 
Moreover,  a  portion  of  these  assets  can  be  sold  to  cover  the  tax  liability 
on  the  accrued  income  they  generate.  (Sales  of  shares  of  stock,  for 
example,  could  be  used  to  pay  the  tax  on  their  accrued  increase  in 
value.)  For  assets  that  are  traded  on  thin  markets,  if  they  are  traded  at 
al1  (such  as  Van  Gogh  paintings),  valuation  is  difficult  and  there  is  no 
way  to  sell  portions  of  these  assets  to  pay  the  tax  liability  on  their 
accrued  increase  in  value. 
Capital  Gains  Tax  Rates,  Savers,  and  Investors 
Up  to  this  point  our  analysis  has  assumed  that  owners  of  firms  and 
potential  investors  evaluate  the  net  present  value  of  investment  projects 
at  a  fixed  interest  rate  set  independently  of  capital  gains  taxation.  This 
assumption,  however,  may  not  be  correct.  A  change  in  the  capital  gains 
tax  rate  changes  the  return  savers  can  obtain  on  their  investments  in 
certain  kinds  of  firms.  Lower  capital  gains  taxes  may  reduce  the  return 
savers  require  to  provide  investment  finance  to  firms  and  may  also 
change  the  allocation  of  funds  to  different  sectors  of  the  economy.  In 
this  section  we  shall  evaluate  the  logic  and  quantitative  significance  of 
this  phenomenon. 
Suppose  that  a  potential  investor  requires  a  fixed  after-tax  rate  of  return, 
say,  10.0  percent,  to  make  it  worthwhile  to  put  money  into  a  firm.  If  the 
firm  pays  out  all  its  income  as  dividends  (and,  hence,  does  not  generate 
capital  gains)  and  the  maximum  personal  tax  rate  on  dividends,  as  in 
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current  law,  is  39.6  percent,  then  the  firm  will  have  to  earn  a  before-tax 
rate  of  return  (r)  that  satisfies  the  equation 
10  =  (l-  .396)  r 
Solving  for  1  yields  a  necessary  before-tax  rate  of  return  of  16..56  percent; 
that  is,  the  firm  will  be  able  to  attract  capital  from  this  investor  only  if  it 
can  provide  a  before-tax  return  of  16.56  percent.  If  the  investor  is 
representative  of  the  financial  community,  the  firm  will  undertake  an 
investment  project  only  if  its  managers  believe  the  project  will  attain  a 
return  at  least  this  high. 
Now  suppose  that  a  similar  firm  retains  its  income  rather  than  paying  it 
out  as  dividends.  The  owners  of  this  firm  will  receive  capital  gains 
income  by  selling  the  firm’s  shares,  which  will  have  appreciated  through 
the  value  built  up  in  the  company  by  its  historical  retained  earnings.  0ur 
representative  investor  still  requires  an  after-tax  return  of  10.0  percent, 
but  in  this  case  the  relevant  tax  rate  is  the  effective  capital  gains  tax 
rate,  which  in  current  law  is  28.0  percent,  a  rate  below  the  rate  for  divi- 
dend  income.  Solving  the  same  equation  for  r, 
10  =  (l-  -28)  r 
yields  a  necessary  before-tax  rate  of  return  of  13.89  percent;  that  is,  this 
firm  would  need  to  realize  a  return  of  only  13.89  percent  to  attract 
funds  and  make  an  investment  project  worthwhile.  If  the  two  firms 
were  identical  in  all  respects,  except  that  one  pAid  dividends  and  one 
retained  earnings,  one  would  expect  that  the  firm  that  retains  its  earn- 
ings  would  undertake  more  investment  projects.13  A  fall  in  the  capital 
gains  rate  to  19.8  percent,  as  is  now  being  considered,  would  lower  the 
before-tax  rate  of  return  the  firm  must  pay  to  investors  even  further; 
solving  for  r  in  the  equation 
IO  =  (l-  .198)  r 
yields  a  necessary  before-tax  mte  of  return  of  12.47  percent.  A  capital  gains 
tax  rate  cut,  by  favoring  capital  gains  income  to  an  even  greater  extent 
than  current  law,  will  lower  the  rate  of  return  firms  will  have  to  give  their 
investors  and,  therefore,  encourage  them  to  undertake  more  projects. 
22  Public  Policy  Briej . 
Effects  of  a  Capital  Guins  ‘Tim Cut  on  th  hwmwnt  Behavior of  Fimu 
This  effect  seems  rather  large,  but  it  ignores  many  complexities  of 
the  cost  of  capital.  For  example,  the  cost  of  using  capital  includes 
depreciation  as  well  as  the  return  that  must  be  provided  to  owners.  We 
must  also  recognize  that  firms  finance  some  investment  with  debt  rather 
than  equity  or  retained  earnings  and  that  some  of  the  return  to  equity  is 
paid  in  the  form  of  dividends  rather  than  capital  gains.  These  and  other 
factors  are  incorporated  into  the  formula  for  the  cost  of  capital  derived 
in  the  appendix.  When  we  use  this  formula  to  evaluate  the  proposed 
drop  in  the  maximum  statutory  capital  gains  tax  rate  from  28.0  to  19.8 
percent,  the  effective  cost  of  capital  declines  between  0.5  and  1.7  per- 
cent.  (The  exact  number  depends  on  other  assumptions  made  in  the 
analysis,  as  discussed  in  the  appendix.)  This  change  is  quite  small;  it  car- 
responds  to  what  we  might  expect  as  a  result  of  a  decline  in  interest  rates 
of  roughly  25  basis  points,  on  average.  While  the  direction  of  the  effect 
on  investment  through  this  channel  is  clear,  its  quantitative  effect  may 
be  of  little  practical  importance.  (The  quantitative  effect  is  evaluated 
more  extensively  below.) 
Other  complicating  factors  are  likely  to  reduce  the  positive  effects  on 
investment  of  a  cut  in  capital  gains  taxes  even  further.  The  discussion 
above  applies  to  the  situation  immediately  following  a  cut  in  capital 
gains  tax  rates.  Moving  a  step  hrther,  suppose  that  firms  undertake  more 
projects  because  they  perceive  that  they  need  not  provide  their  investors 
with  such  high  rates  of  return.  The  demand  for  investment  timds  would 
rise  throughout  the  economy,  driving  interest  rates  up  and  offsetting  the 
benefit  of  lower  capital  gains  rates  for  investment.  Indeed,  if  aggregate 
saving  is  not  very  sensitive  to  interest  rates,  as  some  empirical  studies 
find  (for  example,  Hall  1988,  Skinner  and  Feenberg  1990),  the  offset 
might  be  nearly  complete.14  In  addition,  there  would  probably  be  some 
reallocation  of  investment.  The  improved  after-tax  return  on  invest- 
ments  that  generate  returns  in  the  form  of  capital  gains  would  tend  to 
attract  capital  away  from  activities  that  are  financed  with  debt  and  those 
that  generate  dividends,  raising  the  opportunity  cost  of  funds  for  firms 
that  use  these  alternative  methods.  Some  might  argue  that  a  reallocation 
toward  projects  undertaken  in  anticipation  of  capital  gains  income  is 
good  because  it  favors  riskier  activities.  But  such  a  judgment  is  not  easy 
to  assess  and,  in  any  case,  the  lost  investment  for  firms  that  rely  relatively 
more  on  debt  and  dividends  than  on  capital  gains  must  be  viewed  as  an 
offset  to  the  investment  gains  arising  from  lower  capital  gains  taxes. 
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Capital Gains Taes  and Inflation 
Under  the  present  tax  law  economywide  inflation  raises  the  effective 
real  tax  rate  on  capital  gains  income  above  the  statutory  rate.  The 
increase  occurs  hecause  nominal  rather  than  real  gains  are  subject  to  tax- 
ation.  The  tax  reform  proposal  passed  by  the  House  of  Representatives 
would  index  capital  gains  for  inflation  and  tax  only  real  gains.  The  result 
would  be  a  reduction  in  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  paid  when  the  econ- 
omy  experiences  positive  infIation. 
To  illustrate  the  effect  inflation  has  on  the  effective  real  capital  gains 
tax  rate,  consider  a  capital  asset  purchased  for  $1,000,  held  for  five 
years,  and  then  sold  for  $1,762.  Th  is  asset  generated  a  nominal  return  of 
$762,  or  an  annual  rate  of  return  of  12.0  percent.  For  a  taxpayer  in  the 
28.0  percent  tax  bracket,  the  tax  liability  on  this  gain  is  $213  ($762  x 
0.28).  Suppose  that  through  the  five-year  period,  the  annual  rate  of 
inflation  is  3.0  percent.  For  a  $1,000  investment  to  maintain  only  its 
original  purchasing  power  over  this  period,  it  must  increase  in  value  by 
$159  to  $1,159.  The  difference  between  the  nominal  gain  ($762)  and 
the  gain  necessary  to  compensate  for  inflation  ($159)  is  the  real 
increase  in  the  purchasing  power  of  the  asset  ($603).  When  the  asset 
owner  pays  $213  tax  on  a  real  gain  of  $603,  the  effective  tax  rate  on  the 
(real,  inflation-adjusted)  return  is  35.0  percent  ($213  +  $603).  In  this 
illustration,  indexing  capital  gains  for  inflation  amounts  to  changing 
the  basis  of  the  capital  asset  from  $1,000  to  $1,159.15  The  reported  cap- 
ital  gain  then  decreases  from  $762  to  $603,  the  tax  liability  from  $213 
to  $169  ($603  x  0.28),  and,  thus,  the  tax  rate  on  the  real  gain  declines 
from  35.0  percent  to  28.0  percent. 
Since  investors  are  concerned  with  their  real  purchasing  power,  it  is 
this  effective  real  tax  rate  on  capital  gains  that  determines  the  rate  of 
return  firms  must  yield  to  attract  capital.  As  we  described  above,  the 
lower  the  tax  rate  on  capital  gains  income,  the  lower  the  cost  of  capital 
for  firms  that  pay  owners  with  capital  gains.  As  long  as  there  is  a  posi- 
tive  rate  of  inflation,  indexing  capital  gains  for  inflation  will  decrease 
the  reaI  tax  rate  on  capital  gains  and  decrease  the  cost  of  capital  for 
these  firms. 
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In  this  section  we  evaluate  the  extent  to  which  the  proposed  cut  in  capi- 
tal  gains  tax  rates  and  indexation  would  affect  the  U.S.  economy.  We 
consider  how  the  tax  changes  under  discussion  in  Congress  during  the 
fall  of  1995  would  affect  the  cost  of  capital  and  how  changes  in  the  cost 
of  capital  would  translate  into  investment  and  growth. 
Briefly,  reducing  the  tax  rate  on  capital  gains  income  and  indexing  capi- 
tal  gains  for  inflation  decrease  the  cost  of  capital  to  firms  who  pay  their 
owners,  at  least  in  part,  with  capital  gains  income.  We  call  the  two  chan- 
nels  through  which  the  cost  of  capital  falls  the  “saving”  and  ‘Yndexation” 
channels.  At  a  lower  cost  of  capital,  firms  invest  more,  which  increases 
the  size  of  the  U.S,  capital  stock.  A  larger  capital  stock  in  turn  produces 
more  output  (GDP).  W  e  evaluate  the  size  of  this  increase  in  output  by 
comparing  it  to  increases  that  result  from  normal  growth.  More  specifi- 
cally,  we  estimate  how  many  days  of  normal  growth  the  economy  would 
need  without  the  policy  change  to  produce  the  increase  in  output  that 
arises  from  the  capital  gains  tax  cut.  (The  results  are  summarized  in 
Table  1.) 
Table  1  Summary  Effects  of  Lowering  the  Statutory  Capital  Gains  Tax 
Rate  and  Indexing  Capital  Gains  for  Inflation 
Saving  lndexation  Combined 
Channel  Channel  Effect 
Percent  decrease  in  the  cost  of  capital  1.14  1.61  2.25 
Percent  increase  in  the  capital  stock  Q.57  0.81  1.13 
Percent  increase  in  output  0.17  0.24  0.34 
Equivalent  days  of  normal  growth  25  35  50 
MXC  The  saving  channel  estimates  the  effect  of  lowering  the  statutory  capital  gains  tax 
rate  from  26.0  to  19.8  percent.  Normal  growth  is  defined  to  be  2.5  percent  pet  year.  See 
the  appendix  for  a  detailed  explanation  of  these  figures and  an  analysis of  alternative  sce- 
narios. 
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These  effects  are  quite  smaK  They  imply  that  eventualty,  after  the  capital 
stock  has  fully  adjusted  to  the  lower  capital  gains  tax  rate,  the  level  of 
output  will  be  only  slightly  higher  than  it  would  have  been  without  the  tax 
cut.  The  size  of  the  increase  in  output  is  what  we  would  expect  from  normal 
trend  growth  in  just  a  month  or  two.  Note  that  this  is  an  increase  in  the 
,IeweI  of  output.  The  tax  cut  does  not  change  the  long-run  rate  of  growth  of 
the  economy.  We  shall  now  discuss  these  results  in  greater  detail. 
The  Cost  of  Capital 
The  capital  gains  tax  cut  proposal  now  under  consideration  in  the  U.S+ 
Congress  would  eliminate  the  28.0  percent  cap  on  the  taxation  of  capi- 
tal  gains  that  was  set  in  the  1986  Act,  but  would  allow  an  exclusion  of 
-50.0  percent  of  capital  gains  income  from  taxes.  Since  the  highest  mar- 
ginal  personal  tax  rate  is  currently  39.6  percent,  the  maximum  statu- 
tory  ra!e  on  capital  gains  income  would  become  19.8  percent.16  How 
would  this  change  affect  the  cost  of  capital  firms  use  to  evaluate  the 
profitability  of  investment  projects?  One  effect  that  we  can  quantify  is 
how  lower  tax  rates  would  alter  the  return  firms  must  provide  to  their 
investors  to  attract  funds.  This  required  return  would  be  smaller  since 
investors  would  pay  lower  taxes  on  the  capital  gains  that  accrue  to 
their  investments. 
The  formula  derived  in  the  appendix  allows  us  to  estimate  the  size  of  this 
effect.  With  the  current  tax  law,  we  estimate  the  cost  of  capital  to  be 
14.04  percent.  This  figure  includes  the  tax-adjusted  real  return  that  firms 
must  provide  to  compensate  their  investors  for  the  returns  they  forgo  by 
investing  money  in  the  firms’  projects  (4.04  percent)  and  the  deprecia- 
tion  rate  on  new  capital  (10.0  percent).  We  estimate  that  lowering  the 
capital  gains  tax  rate  from  28.0  to  19.8  percent,  in  what  we  call  our 
“benchmark”  scenario,  would  reduce  this  figure  to  13.88  percent,  a 
decline  of  16  basis  points  or  only  1.14  percent.  This  case  is  the  basis  for 
the  saving  channel  figures  in  Table  1. 
The  benchmark  scenario  employs  assumptions  that  reflect  averages 
across  different  kinds  of  firms  and  investors  in  the  economy.  The  actual 
change  in  the  cost  of  capital,  however,  will  depend  on  the  particular 
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situations  of  firms  and  investors;  we  therefore  consider  a  number  of 
alternative  scenarios.  (See  the  appendix  for  detailed  calculations.)  Firms 
with  assets  that  depreciate  faster  than  the  assets  in  a  typical  firm  would 
experience  an  even  smaller  proportionate  decline  in  the  cost  of  capital 
as  a  result  of  a  decline  in  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  because  depreciation 
costs  are  not  affected  by  changes  in  these  tax  rates.  Firms  that  do  not  pay 
dividends  would  enjoy  a  larger  proportionate  decline  in  the  cost  of  capi+ 
tal.  Since  the  owners  of  these  firms  take  their  income  entirely  in  the 
form  of  capital  gains,  they  are  more  sensitive  to  changes  in  the  tax  treat- 
ment  of  capital  gains  income.  Shareholder  behavior  is  also  important  in 
determining  the  magnitude  of  the  effects.  The  longer  shareholders  wait 
to  sell  their  shares  and  realize  their  capital  gains,  the  lower  is  the  effec 
tive  capital  gains  tax  rate;  the  longer  this  holding  period,  the  smaller  is 
the  effect  of  a  given  cut  in  the  statutory  capital  gains  tax  rate. 
One  must  keep  in  mind  that  the  estimates  presented  in  the  first  column 
of  Table  1  probably  overstate  the  effect  of  the  saving  channel.  These 
estimates  do  not  account  for  the  fact’that  if  the  demand  for  funds 
increases  after  the  initial  dechne  in  the  cost  of  capital,  savers  will  require 
higher  returns  to  fund  additional  new  investment.  The  tax  cut  itself 
could  therefore  lead  to  changes  in  capital  markets  that  increase  interest 
rates  to  some  extent. 
In  addition,  the  estimates  of  saving  channel  effects  may  be  overstated  as 
a  result  of  our  treatment  of  the  effective  capital  gains  tax  rate.  There  are 
several  ways  that  researchers  studying  this  issue  account  for  the  fact  that 
investor  behavior  pushes  the  effective  tax  rate  on  capital  gains  income 
below  the  statutory  rate.  A  common  practice  is  to  halve  the  statutory 
rate  to  account  for  deferral  benefits  and  to  halve  the  resulting  rate  again 
to  account  for  the  step-up  of  the  cost  basis  of  a  capital  gain  upon  inheri- 
tance.  The  estimates  in  Table  1  are  based  on  an  approach  that  does  not 
reduce  the  effective  capital  gains  tax  rate  to  this  degree.  As  shown  in  the 
appendix,  the  cost  of  capital  declines  by  only  0.48  percent  with  the  con- 
ventional  (double-halving)  method,  compared  with  the  1.14  percent 
decline  we  use  for  the  calculations  in  Table  1. 
The  size  of  the  saving  channel  effects:presented  in  Table  1,  moreover, 
could  easily  be  dominated  by  changes  in  interest  rates  from  other  causes. 
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A  100  basis  point  change  in  real  interest  rates,  which  is  not  uncommon 
over  a  period  of  a  couple  of  years,  has  effects  on  the  cost  of  capital  that 
are  more  than  three  times  larger  than  anything  that  appears  in  Table  1. 
Even  an  interest  rate  change  of  just  2.5  basis  points  will  have  an  effect  on 
the  cost  of  capital  that  is  larger  than  the  effects  reported  there.  The  capi- 
tal  gains  tax  cut  proposal  under  consideration  simply  does  not  do  much 
to  effective  investment  incentives  in  the  U.S.  economy. 
The  estimated  effect  of  the  inflation  indexation  channel  on  the  cost  of 
capital  (holding  the  statutory  capital  gains  tax  rate  constant  at  28.O.per- 
cent)  appears  in  the  second  column  of  Table  1.  Using  the  same  antici- 
pated  inflation  rate  we  used  in  our  benchmark  calculations  (3.0 
percent),  we  find  that  indexing  capital  gains  income  alone  would  reduce 
the  cost  of  capital  from  14.04  percent  to  13.81  percent,  a  decline  of  23 
basis  points  or  1.61  percent.  This  decline  is  modestly  larger  than  the 
decline  we  obtained  for  the  saving  channel  (16  basis  points).  The 
pattern  of  results  for  f%ms  and  shareholders  in  varying  situations  is  simi- 
lar  to  the  alternative  scenarios  discussed  for  the  saving  channel.  (See  the 
appendix  for  further  details.) 
The  results  in  the  third  column  of  Table  1  combine  the  effects  of  the 
indexation  and  saving  channels.  We  estimate  that  these  policy  changes 
together  would  reduce  the  cost  of  capital  from  14.04  percent  to  13.72 
percent,  a  decline  of  32  basis  points  or  2.25  percent.  The  total  effect  is  a 
little  smaller  than  the  sum  of  the  two  channels  evaluated  individually. 
This  occurs  because  indexation  is  less  valuable  as  the  capital  gains  tax 
rate  declines. 
How  a  Capital  Gains  Ta  Cut  Affects  Investment, 
Output,  and Growth 
What  effect  will  the  reductions  in  the  cost  of  capital  discussed  in  the 
previous  section  have  on  the  U.S.  economy  in  terms  of  changes  in 
investment,  output,  and  growth?  We  address  these  questions  by  employ- 
ing  a  widely  used  economic  tool,  the  neoclassical  growth  model.j7 
According  to  this  model,  the  long-term  rate  of  growth  of  output  is  deter- 
mined  by  the  rate  of  labor  force  growth  plus  the  rate  of  technical 
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progress.  Because  changes  in  the  cost  of  capital  and,  therefore,  in  the 
capital  gains  tax  rate  will  not  affect  either  of  these  rates,  a  capital  gains 
tax  cut  will  not  change  the  long-term  rate  of  growth.18  A  lower  cost  of 
capital,  however,  can  increase  the  demand  for  capital  and  raise  invest- 
ment.  This  effect  increases  the  productive  capacity  of  the  economy  and 
causes  the  level  of  output  to  rise.  During  the  transition  period  to  the 
higher  level  of  output,  economic  growth  will  be  temporarily  higher. 
To  estimate  the  size  of  this  effect,  we  must  first  consider  how  much 
additional  investment  will  result  from  the  change  in  the  cost  of  capital 
presented  in  the  first  row  of  Table  1.  In  spite  of  the  importance  of  this 
issue  for  a  variety  of  important  policy  questions,  economic  rescdrch  has 
not  been  able  to  reach  agreement  about  the  sensitivity  of  investment  to 
the  cost  of  capital.  We  shall  assume,  however,  that  a  1  .O  percent  drop  in 
the  cost  of  capital  leads  to  a  0.5  percent  increase  in  the  long-term  level 
of  the  capital  stock.  .An  effect  of  this  magnitude  is  relatively  large  com- 
pared  to  findings  in  existing  research  (Chirinko  1993,  Fazzari  1993). 
We  also  need  to  know  how  much  extra  output  can  be  produced  from  a 
given  rise  in  the  capital  stock.  There  is  wide  agreement  in  research  on 
economic  growth  that  a  1.0  percent  increase  in  the  capital  stock  raises 
output  by  about  0.3  percent  (Mankiw,  Romer,  and  Weil  1992). 
These  estimates  provide  the  information  necessary  to  evaluate  the 
amount  of  growth  that  can  be  expected  from  the  proposed  cut  in  capital 
gains  taxes.  Consider  fhst  the  effect  of  the  capital  gains  tax  cut  through 
the  saving  channel  (the  first  column  of  Table  1).  With  our  benchmark 
assumptions,  the  reduction  in  the  maximum  capital  gains  tax  rate  lowers 
the  cost  of  capital  by  1.14  percent,  which,  in  turn,  raises  investment 
enough  to  increase  the  capital  stock  by  0.57  percent.  A  0.57  percent  rise 
in  the  capital  stock  can  be  expected  to  raise  the  economy’s  potential  out- 
put  by  0.17  percent.  For  an  economy  that  has  a  trend  rate  of  output 
growth  of  about  2.5  percent  per  year,  this  change  represents  a  long-term 
increase  in  the  level  of  output  equal  to  the  growth  the  economy  would 
experience  in  about  25  days  !  If  we  add  the  inflation  indexation  provis 
sion,  we  would  experience  an  increase  from  the  combined  effects  equiva- 
lent  to  almost  50  days  of  growth  (as  shown  in  the  third  column  of  Table 
1).  These  changes  are  very  small.  They  imply  that  after  all  the  adjust- 
ments  to  the  lower  capital  gains  tax  rate  take  place  (which  could  take  a 
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decade  or  more),  output  and  living  standards  might  reach  a  level  in  early 
January  that  they  would  have  attained  some  time  in  late  Fehruary  with- 
out  the  capital  gains  tax  cut  and  inflation  indexation.  This  magnitude 
pales  by  comparison  to  the  output  losses  due  to  recessions  and  slow 
growth  that  the  U.S.  economy  has  experienced,  even  during  the  rela- 
tively  good  economic  performance  of  the  postwar  period. 
Additional  effects  that  we  have  not  quantified  (effects  due  to  uncer- 
tainty  and  the  lock-in  effect,  for  example)  might  increase  to  some 
extent  the  effect  of  a  cut  in  the  capital  gains  tax  rate,  but  as  noted 
above,  these  effects  are  likely  to  he  small,  even  negligible.  Furthermore, 
the  analysis  summarized  in  Tahle  1  does  not  account  for  some  factors, 
such  as  the  increase  in  interest  rates  that  might  arise  from  higher 
investment  demand,  that  could  reduce  even  further  the  effect  of  a 
capital  gains  tax  cut. 
Policy  lmpkations 
The  view  that  lower  capital  gains  taxes  will  somehow  stimulate  consid- 
erahle  investment  and  growth  has  little  support.  The  effects  estimated 
here  show  that  the  likely  henefits  for  the  aggregate  U.S.  economy  from 
this  controversial  tax  cut  are  almost  negligible.  The  distributional 
implications  of  a  capital  gains  tax  cut  are  also  troubling  in  the  absence 
of  a  large  effect  on  aggregate  living  standards.  The  benefits  of  a  capital 
gains  tax  cut  will  accrue  disproportionately  to  the  wealthy,  and  there  is 
little  evidence  that  the  economy  will  experience  much  of  a  gain  in 
output,  employment,  or  living  standards  that  might  justify  such  a 
regressive  tax  policy. 
We  have  a  somewhat  different  view  on  the  proposal  to  index  capital 
gains  income  for  inflation.  Our  analysis  shows  that  we  should  not 
expect  any  substantial  increase  in  investment  or  economic  growth  as  a 
result  of  capital  gains  indexation.  Yet,  it  seems  arbitrary  that  the  level 
of  effective  capital  gains  taxation  varies  with  inflation  rates.  Indexing 
capital  gains  to  inflation  for  tax  purposes,  however,  does  not  justify 
cutting  the  already  low  capital  gains  tax  rate.  At  current  inflation 
rates,  implementation  of  capital  gains  indexing,  as  it  is  now  proposed, 
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would  reduce  the  capital  gains  tax  rate.  However,  it  may  be  better  to 
index  capital  gains  for  inflation  and  at  the  same  time  increase  the 
statutory  capital  gains  tax  rate  by  an  appropriate  amount.  Such  a 
change  would  eliminate  the  arbitrary  link  between  the  capital  gains 
tax  rate  and  the  inflation  rate  and  at  the  same  time  hold  the  effective 
real  capital  gains  tax  rate  constant. 
One  important  assumption  that  drives  these  results  is  that  a  cut  in  the 
capital  gains  tax  rate  does  not  affect  the  rate  of  technical  progress.  The 
assumption  that  technical  change  is  exogenous,  although  it  is  a  stan- 
dard  part  of  neoclassical  growth  theory,  has  been  questioned  in  recent 
research  on  endogenous  sources  of  economic  growth  (Romer  1994, 
Grossman  and  Helpman  1994,  Solow  1994,  Pack  1994).  Yet,  even  if 
the  growth  process  is  more  complex  than  the  standard  neoclassical 
model  implies,  cutting  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  seems  like  an  ineffi- 
cient  way  to  stimulate  technical  change.  Such  a  policy  is  completely 
unfocused  as  it  benefits  old  as  well  as  new  capital,  stagnant  as  well  as 
growing  industries,  and  assets  such  as  real  estate  that  have  little  to  do 
with  technical  progress.19  Poterba  writes  that  “less  than  one-third  of 
reported  [capital]  gains  are  the  result  of  the  appreciation  of  corporate 
equity”  (1989,  48).  Feenberg  and  Summers  argue  that  “only  a  small 
fraction  of  the  benefits  [from  capital  gains  tax  cuts]  goes  to  venture 
capital  or  small  businesses”  and  “between  75  and  80  percent  of  the  first 
five  years’  tax  relief  will  be  a  windfall  to  assets  that  are  already  in 
place”  (1990,  3-4).  Finally,  Minarik  states  that  “a  capital  gains  tax  cut 
would  divert  resources  into  low-value  commercial  real  estate  just  as  the 
1986  tax  reform  brought  those  resources  back  into  equipment”  (1992, 
22).  Policymakers  are  more  likely  to  be  successful  at  boosting  technical 
change  through  policies  such  as  research  and  development  tax  credits. 
Even  the  much-mahgned  investment  tax  credit  focuses  more  sharply 
on  the  progressive  sectors  of  the  economy  than  a  capital  gains  tax  cut 
does.20 
The  channels  through  which  a  change  in  the  rate  of  taxation  of  capital 
gains  income  might  influence  investment  activity  and  economic  growth 
are  complex,  at  least  more  complex  than  one  who  follows  the  debate  on 
this  issue  might  think.  Sound,  measured  policy  can  be  set  only  with  an 
understanding  of  the  nature  and  efficacy  of  these  channels.  The  consid- 
erations  explored  in  this  paper  do  not  offer  much  encouragement  for  the 
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view  that  a  lower  capital  gains  tax  rate  will  have  substantial  beneficial 
effects  on  investment  or  growth. 
This  conclusion  does  not  settle  the  issue  of  what  the  capital  gains  rate 
should  be.  Other  issues,  primarily  distributional  in  nature,  which  we  do 
not  consider  in  detail  here,  enter  into  such  a  decision.  Yet,  as  Minarik 
writes,  “The  real  issue  is  whether  taxing  some  people  at  a  different  rate 
than  others  having  the  same  income  level  is  appropriate.  Under  the 
principles  of  comprehensive  income  taxation,  a  burden  of  proof  rests 
with  anyone  who  argues  that  one  taxpayer  should  be  charged  a  lower 
rate  than  everyone  else  at  his  income  level.  Thus,  those  who  advocate 
an  exclusion  for  capital  gains  incur  this  burden  of  proof”  (1992,  16). 
Our  findings  call  into  question  one  of  the  major  arguments  invoked  to 
provide  this  “burden  of  proof.”  Our  analysis,  therefore,  weakens  the  case 
for  a  capital  gains  tax  cut. 
&pen&i.  The  Impact  of  Chaqgzs in  the  Cz&i  Gains Tax  Rate 
Impact  on  Investors’  Valuation  of  a  Project 
Consider  an  entrepreneur  with  $500,000  in  initial  wealth  who  is  con- 
templating  an  investment  project  that  costs  $100,000.  The  project  is 
quite  risky:  it  has  only  a  20  percent  probability  of  succeeding.  But  the 
estimated  payoff  of  the  project  is  high:  it  will  generate  a  gain  of 
$LOOO,~O  (  in  p  resent  value)  if  it  is  successful.  If  it  is  unsuccessful,  the 
project  has  zero  residual  value. 
This  project  has  a  positive  before-tax  net  expected  value  of  $120,000. 
To  compute  this  figure,  note  that  the  project  generates  a  profit  of 
$l,OOO,OOO  if  it  is  successful  and  a  loss  of  $100,000  if  it  fails.  The 
expected  value  of  the  project  is  equal  to  the  project’s  value  should  it 
succeed  times  the  probability  of  success  less  its  loss  should  it  fail  times 
the  probability  of  failure.  Because  the  project’s  assumed  probability  of 
success  is  20  percent,  its  expected  value  is 
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If  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  is  28.0  percent,  the  entrepreneur’s  expected 
after-tax  wealth  would  rise  by  $86,400  if  the  project  is  undertaken,  so  if 
the  entrepreneur  is  risk  neutral,  she  would  make  the  investment.  If,  how- 
ever,  the  entrepreneur  is  sufficiently  risk  averse  that  she  will  not  under- 
take  the  project  at  the  tax  rate  of  28.0  percent,  will  her  decision  change  if 
the  tax  rate  falls  to  19.8  percent?  If  the  tax  rate  is  cut,  the  entrepreneur’s 
after-tax  wealth  would  be  higher  if  the  project  is  successful  because  she 
will  pay  less  tax  on  her  $l,OOO,OOO  gain,  but  she  would  lose  more  if  the 
project  fails  because  the  tax  benefit  from  her  $100,000  loss  is  less.  With  a 
reasonable  specification  of  the  entrepreneur’s  risk  aversion,  the  lower  tax 
rate  actually  redoes  the  expected  utility  derived  from  the  project.21 
Impact  on  the  Lock-in  Effect 
Suppose  that  an  investor  purchased  an  asset  nine  years  ago  for  $1,000 
and  the  asset  has  since  grown  in  value  at  an  annual  rate  of  10.0  percent 
so  that  today  it  is  worth  $2,357.95.  Suppose  further  that  this  investor  has 
one  more  year  in  his  planning  horizon  and  has  the  opportunity  to  pur- 
chase,  during  the  final  year,  any  asset  that  returns  11.5  percent.  The 
investor  can  sell  his  position  in  the  old  asset  and  use  the  proceeds  to 
invest  in  the  higher-return  asset,  but  must  pay  capital  gains  taxes  on  the 
value  of  his  proceeds.  With  a  capital  gains  tax  rate  of  28.0  percent  the 
investor  is  better  off  holding  the  old  asset  for  one  more  year;  he  is  locked 
into  the  lower+return  asset. 
If  he  were  to  sell  the  lower-return  asset  now,  he  would  have,  after  paying 
capital  gains  taxes,  $1,977.72  remaining  to  invest  in  the  higher-return 
asset: 
$1,000  +  [0.72  x  ($2,357.95  -  $l,OOO)J 
After  one  year  of  earning  11.5  percent  and  paying  capital  gains  tax  on 
those  earnings,  his  wealth  would  be  $2,141.48: 
$1,977.72  +  (0.72  x  0.115  x  $1,977.72) 
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Alternatively,  if  he  were  to  hold  the  asset  paying  a  10.0  percent  return, 
thereby  deferring  capital  gains  taxes  for  an  additional  year,  he  would 
have  $2,147.49: 
$1,000  +  [0.72  x  ($2,593.74  -  !$l,OOO)] 
The  investor  receives  an  additional  $6.01  by  not  selling  the  lower-return 
asset  to  buy  a  higher-return  asset  because  of  the  deferral  benefit  of  the 
capital  gains  tax.  When  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  is  19.8  percent,  the 
advantage  of  holding  the  asset  disappears  and  the  investor  is  better  off 
selling  the  old  asset  to  buy  the  new  asset. 
Impact  on  the  Cost  of  Capital 
Indexing  capital  gains  for  inflation  and  reducing  the  capital  gains  tax 
rate  is  thought  to  increase  aggregate  investment  because  it  lowers  the 
cost  of  capital  to  firms  that  pay  their  owners  in  part  with  capital  gains.  In 
this  section  we  bring  together  the  elements  of  the  after-tax  cost  of  new 
capital  investment. 
The  cost  of  capital  is  “the  price  paid  for  the  use  of  capital  resources  over 
a  defined  period  of  time”  (Auerbach  1983,  905).  The  real  annual  after- 
tax  cost  of  capital  consists  of  annual  maintenance  and  depreciation  costs 
and  opportunity  costs.  If  the  after-tax  purchase  price  of  an  asset  is  I’* 
and  the  asset  depreciates  at  a  rate  ~5,  the  annual  cost  of  maintenance  is 
cVP  *.  Even  if  an  asset  does  not  depreciate  and  requires  no  maintenance, 
there  is  still  an  opportunity  cost  associated  with  purchasing  the  asset 
rather  than  putting  those  funds  into  interest-bearing  assets.  The  higher 
the  interest  rate,  the  higher  is  the  opportunity  cost  of  capital,  Suppose 
each  dollar  returns  r  dollars  of  interest  in  real  terms;  the  real  opportunity 
cost  of  a  unit  of  capital  with  an  after-tax  price  of  P*  is  given  by  7P*,  and 
the  total  afteretax  cost  of  a  unit  of  capital  is  (r  +  6jP  *. 
The  after-tax  purchase  price  of  an  asset  is  the  price  paid  for  the  asset,  PC, 
less  tax  benefits  derived  from  the  investment  tax  credit  and  the  capital 
consumption  allowance.  If  $1  spent  on  a  capital  asset  generates  an 
investment  tax  credit  of  k  dollars  and  a  flow  of  depreciation  allowances 
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price  of  an  asset  is  given  by 
where  z  is  the  statutory  tax  rate  on  corporate  income. 
Let  c  be  the  nominal  opportunity  cost  of  a  $1  capital  investment  and  K 
be  the  expected  rate  of  inflation.  Then  r  can  be  replaced  by  c  -  K.  The 
total  after-tax  cost  of  a  unit  of  capital  is 
For  each  dollar  spent  on  new  capital  equipment,  (c  -  K  +  6)  dollars  are 
spent  on  rrmintenance  and  opportunity  costs.  The  term  (1  -k  -  Q) 
adjusts  this  cost  for  the  investment  tax  credit  and  the  capital  consump- 
tion  allowance.  The  capital  gains  tax  and  indexation  influence  only  the 
opportunity  cost  of  capital,  c.  Percentage  changes  in  the  total  after-tax 
cost  of  capital  due  to  changes  in  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  and  indexation, 
then,  equal  percentage  changes  in  (c  -  w  +  6).  For  this  reason,  we  restrict 
attention  in  Tables  Al  through  A3  (see  pages  39.40,  and  41)  to  quantity. 
O&wrtunicy Cost  of  Capital 
Suppose  that  the  nominal  interest  rate  is  i  and  that  a  firm  finances  a  new 
investment  project  entirely  by  issuing  debt  at  this  rate.  Before  corporate 
taxes,  each  dollar  of  capital  spending  generates  i  dollars  of  interest 
expenses.  However,  since  interest  expenses  are  deductible  from  corporate 
income,  the  after-tax  annual  cost  of  $1  of  debt-financed  investment  is 
(l-  r)i,  where  z  is  the  statutory  tax  rate  on  corporate  income.  This 
value  can  also  be  considered  the  opportunity  cost  of  spending  $1  on  new 
capital  rather  than  investing  in  bonds  that  return  i  before  corporate 
taxes. 
Suppose  a  firm  finances  a  new  investment  project  with  equity,  which 
involves  spending  the  proceeds  from  either  new  share  issues  or  retained 
earnings.  Since  new  share  issues  actually  finance  only  a  small  proportion 
of  new  capital  spending  (approximately  4.9  percent),  we  ignore  them 
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and  focus  entirely  on  retained  earnings  (Henderson  1986).  There  is  no 
explicit  cost  to  using  retained  earnings  to  finance  capital  spending,  but 
we  show  below  that  this  cost  can  be  expressed  as  a  function  of  observed 
variables.  We  refer  to  the  opportunity  cost  of  using  $1  of  retained  earnings 
to  finance  new  investment  as  iq.  Since  this  cost  is  not  deductible  from 
corporate  income,  the  before-  and  after-tax  corporate  costs  are  the  same. 
The  typical  firm  finances  its  new  capital  spending  with  a  mix  of  both 
debt  and  equity.  The  nominal  opportunity  cost  of  capital  faced  by  the 
typical  firm  can  be  expressed  as  a  weighted  average  of  the  costs  attribut- 
able  to  both  these  sources.  Let  the  fraction  of  new  investment  financed 
with  debt  be  L.  Then  the  opportunity  cost  of  capital  is 
[equation  1] 
We  next  consider  the  personal  tax  treatment  of  capital  income  and  its 
influence  on  the  opportunity  cost  of  capital.  There  are  two  ways  to  own 
capital:  as  an  equity  holder  (a  stockholder)  and  as  a  debt  holder.  If  stock- 
holders  earn  an  afteretax  rate  of  return  in  excess  of  the  rate  earned  by 
debt  holders,  the  latter  will  sell  debt  and  buy  stock.22  The  price  of  equity 
then  will  rise  and  the  price  of  debt  fall,  resulting  in  a  convergence  of  the 
two  rates  of  return.  We  expect  the  reverse  to  be  true  if  debt  returns  more 
than  equity.  In  equilibrium,  we  expect  tbat  the  after-tax  rates  of  return 
to  debt  and  equity  will  be  equal. 
Since  interest  payments  are  treated  as  ordinary  personal  income,  the 
after-tax  rate  of  return  to  debt  is  i(l-  rPj,  where  7P  is  the  marginal  tax 
rate  on  personal  income.  The  after-tax  rate  of  return  to  equity  (invest- 
ment  financed  with  retained  earnings)  is  not  as  simple  because  the 
returns  from  equity  investment  can  be  paid  out  as  dividends  or  as  capital 
gains.  For  purposes  of  personal  taxation,  dividends  and  capital  gains  are 
treated  differently.  The  return  to  equity  is  a  weighted  average  of  the 
returns  from  dividend  payments  and  from  capital  gains.  We  assume  that 
the  weights  are  the  shares  of  corporate  income  (net  of  interest  expenses) 
paid  out  as  dividends,  d,  and  plowed  back  as  retained  earnings,  (I  -  d). 
Since  dividends  are  treated  as  ordinary  income,  the  after-tax  rate  of 
return  from  dividend  payments  is  iq  Cl-  rP  j.  The  after-tax  rate  of  return 
from  capital  gains  is 
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where  zcr  is  the  effective  marginal  personal  tax  rate  on  capital  gains 
income,  z  is  the  rate  of  inflation,  and  y  is  unity  if  capital  gains  are 
indexed  for  inflation  and  is  zero  if  otherwise.  Note  that  when  capital 
gains  are  indexed  for  inflation,  real  returns  are  taxed,  and  when  capital 
gains  are  not  indexed  for  inflation,  nominal  returns  are  taxed.  The 
weighted  sum  of  these  two  terms,  and  hence  the  after-tax  rate  of  return 
to  equity,  simplifies  to 
ieq(l-?)+(l-d)rcrv 
where 
Z  =  drt,  +  (l-  d)rcr 
Equating  the  after-tax  returns  to  equity  and  debt  and  solving  for  Ieq 
yields 
Given  that  savers  can  hold  wealth  as  debt  or  equity,  this  expression 
defmes  the  internal  rate  of  return  that  equity-financed  investment  must 
earn  to  remain  competitive  with  debt. 
Substituting  this  expression  into  equation  I  gives  the  nominal  opportu 
nity  cost  of  capital  faced  by  the  typical  firm: 
c  =(l-L) 
ifl-  r,,)-(l-d)~~ry 
1-7  1  +  I._(1  -  r)i  [equation  21 
Parametfzr Values 
Compustat  data  were  used  to  estimate  d  and  I_.  Compustat  tracks  firm- 
level  data  for  publicly  traded  organizations  and  covers  roughly  half  of  the 
U.S.  nonresidential  capital  stock.  For  the  years  1973  through  1992,  the 
following  data  were  summed  across  the  sample:  current  debt  (CD),  long- 
term  debt  (LTD),  total  assets  (TA),  common  dividends  (CDW),  pre- 
ferred  dividends  (PD),  and  after-tax,  before-extraordinary  income  (1). 
For  each  year 
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L.*  =  (CD  +  LTD]/TA  and  d*  =  (CDIV  +  PDj/I 
were  calculated.  The  values  of  L*  and  d*  were  then  averaged  across  years 
to  obtain  L  =  0.3  and  d  2  0.5.  Our  benchmark  firm,  therefore,  finances 
30.0  percent  of  its  investment  with  debt  and  the  remainder  with 
retained  earnings.  Half  of  the  return  to  the  benchmark  firm’s  owners  is 
dividends  and  half  accrues  as  capital  gains. 
In  our  benchmark  case  we  assume  a  real  opportunity  cost  of  placing 
money  in  a  firm’s  assets  of  6.0  percent.  Owners  are  assumed  to  reahze 
capital  gains  after  10  years  (Feenberg  and  Summers  1990).  Nominal 
asset  values  subject  to  capital  gains  taxes  are  assumed  to  grow  at  10.0 
percent  per  year. 
Em@ical  CaMutions 
With  the  cost  of  capital  formula  and  the  parameter  value  assumptions 
discussed  above,  we  can  estimate  the  impact  of  changes  in  the  capital 
gains  tax  rate  on  the  cost  of  capital.  Table  Al  presents  the  effective, 
after-tax  cost  of  capital  for  firms  in  various  circumstances  under  both  a 
28.0  percent  and  a  19.8  percent  statutory  capita1  gains  tax  rate.  Under 
the  current  tax  law  and  using  the  benchmark  assumptions,  we  estimate 
the  effective  cost  of  capital  to  be  14.04  percent.  Lowering  the  capital 
gains  tax  rate  from  28.0  to  19.8  percent  would  reduce  this  figure  to  13.88 
percent  through  the  saving  channel,  a  decline  of  16  basis  points  or  only 
a  little  over  1.0  percent.  How  does  this  result  change  if  we  consider  firms 
in  different  situations?  Table  Al  shows  that  the  change  is  even  smaller 
in  percentage  terms  (under  1.0  percent)  for  high-depreciation  assets, 
which  is  relevant  for  high-technology  items  such  as  computers.  (The 
high-depreciation  case  in  Table  Al  assumes  a  20.0  percent,  rather  than  a 
10.0  percent  depreciation  rate.)  The  smaller  change  occurs  because  a 
bigger  part  of  the  cost  of  capital  arises  from  depreciation.  The  lower  cost 
of  funds  that  the  firms  enjoy  due  to  lower  capital  gains  taxes  therefore 
has  a  smaller  proportionate  effect. 
The  percentage  decline  in  the  cost  of  capital  is  larger  for  zero-dividend 
firms  than  for  the  benchmark  case.  Since  the  owners  of  these  firms  take 
their  returns  entirely  in  the  form  of  capital  gains,  they  are  more  sensitive 
to  the  tax  treatment  of  capita1  gains.  A  short  holding  period  reduces  the 
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Capital  Gains  Tax  Rate  from  28.0  to  19.8  Percent 
Cost  of  Capital 
Under  a  28  Under  a  19.8  Percentage 
Case  Percent  Rate  Percent  Rate  Change 
Benchmark  14.04  13.88  -1.14 
High-depreciation  asset?  24.04  23.88  -0.G7 
Zero-dividend  firms  13.29  13.06  -1.74 
Short  holding  period  14.24  14.01  -1.61 
Low  effective  capital  gains  rate  13.74  13.67  a.48 
benefits  of  deferral  and,  therefore,  increases  the  effective  capital  gains  tax 
rate.  As  a  result,  a  given  cut  in  statutory  rates  has  a  larger  effect  on  people 
who  hold  assets  for  a  relatively  short  period.  (The  short  holding  period 
case  in  Table  Al  assumes  a  5syear  rather  than  a  lo-year  horizon.) 
However,  if  we  take  the  approach  to  computing  the  effective  capital  gains 
tax  rate  followed  in  much  relevant  research  and  cut  the  statutory  rate  by 
half  for  the  deferral  benefit  and  by  half  again  for  the  elimination  of 
capital  gains  for  inheritance,  the  percentage  fall  in  the  cost  of  capital  is 
cut  by  a  factor  of  more  than  two  relative  to  the  benchmark  case  (as 
reported  in  the  low  effective  capital  gains  rate  case  in  Table  Al).23 
Some  analysts  would  argue  that  the  6.0  percent  real  return  assumed  in 
the  benchmark  case  is  high.  Although  historically  the  stock  market  has 
managed  to  generatc  such  returns,  real  returns  on  low-risk  assets  are  typi- 
cally  much  lower.  If  we  use  a  real  rate  of  return  of  3.0  percent,  the  bene- 
fits  of  a  capital  gains  tax  cut  are  reduced. 
The  results  reported  in  Table  Al  are  based  on  the  simplifying  assumption 
that  firms  do  not  change  their  financial  policies  (dividend  payout  and 
debt  leverage)  in  response  to  a  change  in  the  capital  gains  tax  rate.  Yet, 
we  would  expect  that  firms  might  adjust  these  policies  as  the  relative  tax 
rates  on  different  kinds  of  corporate  source  income  change  (Auerbach 
1983).  A  lower  capital  gains  tax  rate  would  probably  encourage  firms  to 
retain  more  of  their  earnings  and  finance  a  lower  share  of  their  invest- 
ment  with  debt.  The  effects  of  these  two  factors  on  the  cost  of  capital 
tend  to  offset  one  another.  A  lower  dividend  payout  reduces  the  cost  of 
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Table  A2  Effect  on  the  Cost  of  Capital  of  Indexing  Capital  Gains 
Taxes  for  Inflation 
Case 
Cost  of  Capital 
Without  With 
lndcxation  Indexation 
Percentage 
Chanee 
Benchmark  14.04  13.81  -1.61 
High-depreciation  assets  24.04  23.81  -0.94 
Zero-dividend  firms  13.29  12.90  -2.92 
Short  holding  period  14.24  13.92  -2.21 
Low  effective  capital  gains  rate  13.74  13.65  -0.70 
capital  as  firms  substitute  a  less  highly  taxed  form  of  income  payment 
(capital  gains)  for  a  more  highly  taxed  form  (dividends).  Lower  leverage 
increases  the  cost  of  capital,  for  our  parameter  values,  because  the 
deductibility  of  interest  for  corporate  tax  payments  reduces  the  cost  of 
debt  below  the  cost  of  equity  finance.  Even  if  these  two  factors  do  not 
exactly  offset  one  another,  it  is  unlikely  that  the  changes  in  financial 
policy  would  be  large  enough  to  have  an  important  effect  on  the  results 
presented  in  Table  Al. 
Table  A2  reports  the  effect  of  holding  the  statutory  capital  gains  tax  rate 
at  28.0  percent  while  indexing  capital  gains  income  for  inflation.  The 
indexation  effect  is  slightly  larger  than  the  effect  of  lowering  the  stat- 
utory  rate  in  the  benchmark  case  (-1.61  versus  -1.14);  results  in  differ- 
ent  firm  and  shareholder  situations  are  similar. 
We  have  also  anaIyzed  a  high  expected  inflation  scenario  in  which  we 
increased  the  expected  inflation  rate  from  3.0  to  10.0  percent.  In  this  sit- 
uation,  not  surprisingly,  the  indexdtion  proposal  is  especially  valuable, 
lowering  the  effective  cost  of  capital  by  6.02  percent.  This  scenario, 
however,  does  not  represent  the  current  circumstances  of  the  U.S.  econe 
omy,  and,  with  a  central  bank  that  seems  determined  to  avoid  any  acceL 
eration  of  inflation,  it  is  not  likely  that  the  scenario  will  be  relevant  in 
the  foreseeable  future. 
Table  A3  reports  the  predicted  effects  of  simultaneously  reducing  the 
statutory  rate  on  capital  gains  income  and  indexing  capital  gains  income 
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Table  A3  Effect  on  the  Cost  of  Capital  of  L.owering  the  Statutory 
Capital  Gains  Tax  Rate  and  Indexing  for  Infiation 
Case 
Cost  of  Capital 
Under  Under  Percentage 
Current  Law  Prowsed  Law  Change 
F%enchmark  14.04  13.72  -2.25 
High-depreciation  assets  24.04  23.72  -1.31 
Zero-dividend  firms  13.29  12.80  -3.69 
Short  holding  period  14.24  13.79  -3.10 
Low  effective  capital  gains  me  13.74  13.61  -0.96 
for  inflation.  The  total  effect  is  a  little  smaller  than  the  sum  of  the  two 
channels  evaluated  individually.  This  occurs  because  the  indexation  fea- 
ture  is  less  valuable  as  the  capital  gains  tax  rate  declines. 
The  figures  in  Tables  Al  through  A3  are  the  basis  for  the  estimates  that 
appear  in  the  summary  Table  1  in  the  main  text. 
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Notes 
It  is  often  argued  that  such  statistics  are  misleading  because  a  sizable  fraction 
of  capital  gains  goes  to  people  of  modest  means  who  sell  a  home  or  business 
and  therefore  have  artificially  inflated  incomes  in  the  year  they  receive  capi+ 
tal  gains.  Feenberg  and  Summers  (1990),  h  owever,  consider  this  fact  and  find 
that  it  does  not  significantly  change  the  conclusions. 
For  a  legislative  history  of  the  tax  treatment  of  capital  gains,  see  Joint 
Committee  on  Taation  (1995)  and  Office  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
Office  of  Tax  Analysis  (1985). 
Calculation  of  previous  maximum  marginal  rates  on  capital  gains  income  is 
not  this  simple,  partially  because  capital  gains  income  was  not  subject  to  the 




same  statutory  rate  schedule  as  ordinary  income  between  I922  and  1978. 
Also,  beginning  in  1970,  the  excluded  portion  of  capital  gains  income  was 
considered  an  item  of  “tax  preference’  and  subject  to  a  different  “minimum 
tax.”  At  the  same  time,  a  distinction  was  made  between  earned  income  and 
other  income.  Earned  income  was  subject  to  a  lower  “maximum  tax”  than 
other  income.  Each  dollar  of  excluded  capital  gains  income  shifted  some  of 
the  taxpayer’s  total  income  out  of  favorably  treated  earned  income  and  into 
more  highly  taxed  other  income.  The  separate  rate  schedule  had  the  effect  of 
lowering  the  maximum  marginal  rate  on  capital  gains  income.  The  minimum 
tax  and  maximum  tax  provisions  had  the  effect  of  raising  the  maximum  mar- 
ginal  tax  rate  on  capital  gains  income,  Together,  these  provisions  make  the 
calculation  of  the  maximum  marginal  tax  rate  on  capital  gains  income  in  this 
period  complicated.  The  1978  act  eliminated  these  provisions  and  simplified 
the  calculation  of  effective  capital  gains  tax  rates. 
The  theory  used  here  assumes  that  the  firm’s  owners  wish  to  maximize  their 
expected  utility  when  they  face  uncertainty.  This  approach  is  the  dominant 
form  of  analysis  used  in  economic  theory  to  explain  the  behavior  of  agents 
who  make  decisions  in  an  environment  of  uncertainty. 
In  practice,  there  are  restrictions  on  the  way  in  which  capital  loses  can  be 
deducted  against  non-capital  gains  income.  We  shall  return  to  this  later. 
Managers,  however,  may  not  follow  owners’  wishes.  For  example,  if  it  is 
costly  for  managers  to  find  new  jobs  in  the  case  of  a  business  failure,  man 
age&  personal  risk  aversion  may  be  reflected  in  the  investment  decisions  of 
the  firm  even  if  such  behavior  is  not  in  the  best  interest  of  shareholders.  This 
kind  of  phenomenon  is  called  an  “agency  problem”  in  the  economics 
research  literature. 
The  restrictions  on  external  funds  that  firms  face  may  take  the  form  of  an 
increased  cost  of  credit  or  they  may  result  from  rationing  (or,  firms’  inability 
to  obtain  external  finance  no  matter  what  price  they  pay).  The  extensive 
empirical  literature  linking  external  finance  restrictions  to  investment  is  sur- 
veyed  by  Hubbard  (1995). 
See  Fazzari  and  Variate  (1994)  for  further  discussion  of  how  restrictions  on 
firms’  access  to  external  finance  may  lead  firm  insiders  to  take  undiversified 
positions. 
One  should  not  exaggerate  the  importance  of  venture  capital  for  aggregate 
investment.  Al-Suwailem  shows  that  total  U.S.  venture  capital  disburse- 
ments  never  exceeded  $4  billion  in  any  single  year  from  1984  to  1993. 
During  this  period  nonresidential  fixed  investment  averaged  over  $500  bil- 
lion  annually. 
10,  One  might  criticize  the  assumption  that  capital  losses  are  fttlly  deductible 
against  other  capital  gains  income.  If  the  potential  investment  projects  are 
part  of  a  firm’s  ongoing  operations,  the  costs  of  unsuccessful  ventures,  such  as 
the  costs  of  unsuccessful  R&D  projects,  can  be  written  off  against  profits  from 
other  parts  of  the  business.  In  mutual  funds,  losses  incurred  on  some  securi- 
ties  will  reduce  the  taxable  gains  from  other  successful  activities  undertaken 
hy  the  firms  in  the  fund.  Also,  even  if  the  restriction  on  deducting  capital 
losses  does  bind  in  a  given  year,  losses  can  be  carried  forward  to  offset  future 
capital  gains. 
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11.  This  result  occurs  because  the  concept  of  risk  aversion  implies  that  as  indi- 
viduals  acquire  more  wealth?  they  value  incremental  additions  to  wealth  less. 
Therefore,  for  an  individual  who  is  sufficiently  risk  averse,  the  incremental 
v&e  of  the  return  from  a  project  when  the  project  is  successful  and  the 
investor  is  wealthy  means  less  to  the  investor  than  the  incremental  loss  due 
to  a  lower  tax  deduction  when  the  project  fails  and  the  investor’s  wealth  is 
1  ower. 
12.  Some  analysts  argue  that  the  lock-in  effect  actually  enhances  efficiency 
becau-w  it  reduces  the  incentive  for  excessive  trading  of  financial  assets  for 
short-term  gain  and  causes  investors  to  focus  on  long-term  productivity. 
13.  This  analysis  does  not  consider  why  firms  pay  dividends  at  all  given  their  tax 
consequences.  Cne  likely  reason  is  that  dividends  provide  sign&  of  manage- 
ment’s  assessment  of  long-term  earning  potential.  These  signals  may  be  value 
able  enough  to  investors  to  offset  the  tax  Jisadvdnmges. 
14.  In  a  Keynesian  context,  when  resources  arc  not  fully  employed,  an  increase 
in  investment  demand  will  stimulate  the  saving  necessary  to  finance  it  in 
equilibrium.  Interest  rates  might  still  rise  in  this  environment,  however, 
because  of  a  rise  in  money  demand  or  an  increase  in  the  rate  of  interest 
charged  by  financial  intermediaries. 
15.  The  House  bill  prescribes  multiplying  the  basis  of  the  capital  asset  by  the 
ratio  of  the  GDP  deflator  for  the  quarter  in  which  the  asset  was  sold  to  the 
GDP  deflator  for  the  quarter  in  which  the  asset  was  purchased. 
16.  During  the  budget  debate  between  Congress  and  the  White  House  in  1995,  a 
21.0  percent  tax  rate  on  capital  gains  income  for  individuals  subject  to  the 
alternative  minimum  tax  was  considered. 
17.  This  model  was  pioneered  by  Robert  Solow  (1956)  and  is  often  referred  to  as 
the  Solow  growth  model.  This  discussion  focuses  only  on  “supply-side” 
effects.  To  the  extent  that  Keynesian  demand  insufficiency  prevents  the 
economy  from  reaching  the  full  employment  level  of  output,  the  effects  dis- 
cussed  here  will  overstate  actual  results. 
18.  Some  recent  theoretical  models  of  “endogenous”  economic  growth  allow  for  the 
possibility  that  changes  in  capital  investment  will  affect  the  rate  of  technical 
change  (Romer  1994,  Grossman  and  Helpman  1994,  Solow  1994,  Pack  1994). 
The  empirical  relevance  of  these  models  has  yet  to  be  determined.  We  discuss 
some  of  the  po+.sible  implications  of  endogenous  growth  in  the  next  section. 
19.  While  it  may  be  possible  to  focus  a  capital  gains  tax  cut  on  the  returns  from 
particular  activities,  this  does  not  seem  to  be  the  intention  of  current  pro- 
posals.  Moreover,  differentiating  the  capital  gains  tax  treatment  across  assets 
could  create  incentives  to  create  unproductive  tax  shelters. 
20.  The  investment  tax  credit  as  implemented  in  the  past,  however,  suffers  from 
similar  problems  as  the  capital  gains  tax  cut:  it  benefits  many  activities  that 
would  have  been  undertaken  in  the  absence  of  the  credit.  An  investment  tax 
credit  policy  might  be  more  effective  per  dollar  of  federal  revenue  lost  if  it 
could  be  designed  to  apply  to  net  or  incremental  investment  only.  See  Meyer, 
Prakken,  and  Varvares  (1993)  for  further  discussion. 
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21.  Specifically,  we  assume  that  the  entrepreneur’s  utility  timction  displays  con- 
stant  relative  risk  aversion  with  a  coefficient  of  2.0.  This  specification  has 
some  support  in  the  literature  on  decision  making  under  uncertainty  (for 
example,  Friend  and  Blume  1975  and  Zeldes  1989). 
22.  We  are  ignoring  issues  of  risk.  Normally,  we  expect  that  equity  holders  will 
require  some  risk  premium  that  will  keep  rates  on  equity  higher  than  rates  on 
debt.  This  issue  will  not  significantly  affect  the  analysis. 
23.  This  approach  was  derived  originally  by  Bailey  (1969).  Also  see  King  and 
Fullerton  (1984). 
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